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Looking at data from HUD’s low income housing tax credit database from 
1987 to 2001, we  examine how the US tax credit program has 
concentrated poverty in neighborhoods by offering advantages to 
developing low income housing projects in low income census tracts.  We 
then  use a simple  Cellular Automata model to explore how alternative 
programs  structures  could impact economic diversity and poverty 
concentration.  This model suggests that many widely dispersed fixed 
location affordable housing projects increase local economic diversity over 
alternative housing allocation rules.  If policymakers wish align the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit program with the goal of promoting economic 
diversity in our neighborhoods,  they should restructure the  bonus  to 
reward to projects in areas without a concentration of subsidized housing.
This paper is a work in progress, so comments and suggestions from readers are
encouraged.  Send them via email to: Kevin.Jewell /at/ mba05.mccombs.utexas.edu.
I wish to extend thanks to Walter Moreau, Foundation Communities and James K. 
Galbraith, University of Texas, Austin for inspiration and ideas.  The errors and 
shortcomings of this work, however, remain mine.2
Introduction
Interstate highway 35 runs through the heart of downtown Austin, TX.  Like many 
urban interstates, it acts as both a physical and cultural barrier to the residents of 
the city.  West of I-35 sits the state capital complex and some of the highest 
income residential areas in the city. East of I-35 lays the city’s historically black 
neighborhoods as well as some of the city’s lowest income census tracts.
Of the 59 affordable housing projects funded by the Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit (LIHTC) program in 
Austin, 54 are tightly clustered 
on the east side of Interstate 
Highway 35.  Only 5 lie west of 
this divider.  Only seven are in 
non-majority-minority census 
tracts, and only two of the 
projects in the city were placed 
in affluent neighborhoods 
(defined here as census tracts 
that had household median 
incomes greater the median for the city at large.)
1
   
1 Source: Authors calculations from the HUD LIHTC Database and the City of Austin planning 
department’s compilation of STF1A and STF3A 1990 Census; US Census Bureau..
LIHTC projects in this map of Austin are marked in 
green, Minority-majoritytracts are shaded. I-35 is the 
north-south highway on right.  
Source: HUD Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) Database, ESRI Data and Maps: Texas.3
The LIHTC program developed this concentrated spatial distribution because the 
program, through the Qualified Census Tract (QCT) bonus, directly rewards it.  
The original goal of the QCT program was to reward developers for their
perceived higher risk of building new housing in tougher neighborhoods.  HUD 
designates the lowest income tracts in a city as QCTs.
2 Projects in QCTs are 
offered a 30% bonus over non-QCT projects, and as of 2001, the majority of 
states also gave projects in these tracts preference in the proposal selection 
process (Gustafson and Walker, 2002).  
Developers indicate that high land costs in central Austin make it difficult put 
together a deal without the 30% bonus, so they rarely consider land outside of 
the designated tracts for their deals.
3 As each developer individually focuses on 
QCT developments, projects only get done in QCT tracts.
This income segregation and LIHTC placement pattern isn’t unique to Austin – it 
repeats itself in cities across the country.  Appendix A lists the cities with the 
greatest percentage placement of LIHTC projects in the low income QCT tracts.  
We see that Austin while has placed over 75% of its projects in QTC tracts, it 
ranks only 14
th in urban project QCT placement.  Cincinnati tops the list, with 
every single one of its 26 LIHTC projects in low-income QCT neighborhoods.  
   
2 A tract is eligible for QCT status if the majority of tract residents are eligible for HUD housing 
programs, but no more than 20% of the tracts in an MSA can be designated as QCTs and lower 
income tracts are given priority.  Many of the large coastal metropolises (such as New York, 
Boston, and Los Angles) are designated “Difficult Development Areas” and are exempt from the 
QCT system, lowering the political profile of this issue.
3 Interview with Walter Moreau, Executive Director, Foundation Communities 4
Buron (2000) also found in a study of 5 MSAs (Boston, Kansas city, Miami, 
Milwaukee, and Oakland), that only 14% pf projects were found in tracts with low 
poverty rates (defined as less than 10% of population living in poverty.)  Buron 
also found that 88% of the LIHTC projects were found in majority-minority 
neighborhoods, highlighting possible the fair housing implications of this project
concentration.
Yet since William Julius Wilson’s seminal 1987 work The Truly Disadvantaged, a 
growing body of sociological literature has grown to document the hazards of 
concentrated poverty.  Neighborhood income affects family income through 
vectors such as school quality, crime rates, density of social networks, and job 
opportunities (Goetz 2003). The clustering of low-income families reduces the 
opportunities available to these families to raise themselves out of poverty.  See 
Goetz (2003), Rusk (1999), and Jargowsky, (1997), for an in-depth overview of 
the poverty concentration literature.
As an understanding of the feedback loop of concentrated poverty has 
developed, poverty concentration/de-concentration has emerged to be an 
important dimension of US housing policy. To many housing advocates, 
promoting racial and economic diversity in residential neighborhoods is one of 
the most important goals of housing programs (Katz et. al. 2003).  After a series 
of lawsuits known as the Gautreaux cases in the 70s raised fair housing 
arguments against poverty concentration, HUD has recognized this goal in the 
implementation of some of its housing programs. 5
Simulating the problem with Cellular Automata
The Cellular Automata (CA) framework is well suited to examine the dynamics of 
spatial segregation and concentration.  In cellular automata, many individual 
units (“cells”) are arrayed in a simple 1 or 2 dimensional field.  Each cell exists in 
a simple state, such as on-off, or high-low (income).  Over time, each cell 
implements its “automata” rule and changes its state based on the states of the 
cells in its immediate neighborhood.  However, each of these individual state 
changes then alters the environment for the other cells in its neighborhood, and 
the next round they react in turn. As this process is iterated, simple local rules 
can result in broad patterns well beyond local neighborhoods.
The use of a CA-like framework to study the dynamics of segregation was 
pioneered in the economics literature by Schelling (1971, 1978).  In his “Spatial 
Proximity Model of Segregation“ Schelling demonstrated a simple model that
showed even slight preferences for like-neighbors would easily snowball into 
heavy segregation patterns across a city.  
Albin (1975) refined Schelling ‘s model and placed it explicitly in the Cellular 
Automata framework.  In Albin’s model, each family is a cell, and decides its 
location on a 2 dimensional space each timeframe using the information it knows 
about the state (i.e. race) of its neighbors the previous cycle. It is an modification6
The Von
Neumann 
neighborhood of the 
green cell is the red 
area and itself.
of this framework that we will use to examine the dynamics of income 
concentration and the placement of LIHTC projects.
The model:
In our model, the city is represented as a 29x29 grid, resulting in 841 cells, each   
representing a residential property.  For each property, a 
neighborhood is defined as each of its four fence line 
neighbors as well as itself.  This is known as the Von 
Neumann neighborhood, after Von Neumann (1966). The 
model is begun with property values randomly distributed 
(on a uniform distribution) throughout the city.  
In each round of the model, two dynamics are implemented.  The first is a 
property value feedback rule.  Each property’s value is updated to reflect the 
average property value across its last round Von Neumann neighborhood.  This 
reflects the interaction of property value, income, and neighborhood income 
feedback.
4
Second, high income households move out of low income neighborhoods to 
higher income neighborhoods, and low-income households relocate to low land 
   
4 As an intuitive example of this three way interaction, imagine that higher income 
neighbors have security systems which reduce neighborhood crime. This both 
increases home values and decreased the income impacts of crime on 
neighbors.  Alternatively, imagine higher income households are able to use 
increased political influence to bring economic development to the area.  This 
raises land value and job opportunities for the neighborhood.7
value cells.  This is similar to the movement in the Schelling spatial proximity 
model.  Both the Schelling and Albin models are explicitly closed neighborhood 
models, where the ratio of low-income and high income families are fixed, and 
the only outcome is the location of the families.  The cellular automata model 
used here follows that tradition, but households decide their location based on 
property values rather than a like-neighbor rule.  In this implementation, 17% if
the cells are considered “low income,” and 83% are considered high or moderate 
income.
Finally, fixed location low-income housing projects are placed in the city.  These 
cells are subject to a different rule set than other cells.  The property value and 
household income in these properties set at the lowest end of the distribution., 
the property will always be occupied by low-income families, and its value is not 
subject to the feedback rule.
The model is examined under 3 variations of the rules defining project 
placement:
1) No fixed location affordable housing projects (open market or market 
based vouchers)
2) Projects are clustered (current QCT system)
3) Projects are located set distance from other projects (Alternative 
placement rule)
The outcome of each model is evaluated by examining the number of 
“concentrated poverty” neighborhoods. These are neighborhoods where every 8
property in its Von Neumann neighborhood is in the lowest 17% income bracket.  
This reflects a household which is in poverty and all of its neighbors are in 
poverty as well.
Results:
Poverty clusters emerge over the long term regardless of the project allocation 
rules.  This is due to the feedback rules that recognize high income families will 
move away from low income neighborhoods.  Of interest, however, is that with no 
fixed location project, the location of these clusters varies by the initial conditions.  
With neighborhood feedback, fixed location projects always end up anchoring 
clusters of low income households.  Diagram A shows cluster development over 
time under three project placement rules. 9
Diagram A
Result of three different project placement rules from the same initial 
conditions. Red indicates a household with income is in the lowest 
17% of the cells, and green indicates a fixed location project.























In the run depicted in diagram A, the clustered fixed location projects result in a 
significantly higher proportion of concentrated poverty neighborhoods that the 
other rules.    This result was found to be robust across 1,000 variations of the 
random initial conditions.  Appendix B shows the distribution of the results of the 
simulations.  Table A shows the average proportion of concentrated poverty 
neighborhoods for each project placement rule.
Table A
Rule set Average concentrated poverty 
neighborhoods as a percent of total 
poverty neighborhoods
Starting distribution .08%
No fixed projects after 50 
iterations
58% 
Clustered fixed projects after 50 
iterations
70% 




Fixed projects anchor areas of concentrated poverty.  Separating projects 
creates more interfaces between high and low income neighborhoods by splitting 
up poverty clusters. Dispersed fixed projects can lead to higher levels of 
economic diversity and lower levels of concentrated poverty than no fixed 
projects whatsoever. 
This is due to natural Schelling-like “segregation” as upper-income households 
move away from low income neighbors.  One can interpret the “no fixed project” 
runs as representing either no housing projects or market based subsidizes.  11
With demand side market based subsidies such as housing mobility vouchers, 
each household still responds to market pressures, and low-income household 
will still look for housing in less expensive neighborhoods to maximize the value 
of their voucher. The outcome of this model suggests that many dispersed small 
fixed affordable housing projects increase local diversity over even housing 
mobility vouchers, a program developed specifically to reduce the concentration 
of subsidized housing.
For practitioners, this model can be considered a thought experiment of the 
single minded pursuit of economic diversity.  In practice, economic diversity is but 
one of many goals of housing policy. Placing fixed location low-income housing 
projects evenly distributed throughout a city conflicts with other goals such
maximizing the supply of units under a fixed budget and spatially linking projects 
with supportive services.  The political reality of placing subsidized housing in 
affluent neighborhoods should also not be discounted. 
Nevertheless, this model suggests that the current QCT system contributes to
poverty concentration and should be restructured to reduce project clustering.  
Without the QCT system developers already have two very strong incentives to 
build affordable housing in the same lower income census tracts that they have 
in the past.  Land is significantly cheaper in low income census tracts than high 
income tracts, and there is less organized political resistance (NIMBYism) as 
well. The QCT structure merely re-enforces this existing incentive.12
Giving a bonus to disperse projects should be considered.  This could be 
structured by rewarding projects in neighborhoods inversely proportional to the 
tract project concentration.  Projects in MSAs would be rewarded for placing 
projects in tracts without an existing LIHTC project concentration.  This would 
help the program work towards the goal of increasing economic diversity, and 
reward developers for taking on the price of land costs and entrenched NIMBY 
resistance.
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Appendix A
Top Concentration of Metro/Central City LIHTC Projects 
in QCTs 
City
metro/Central City  
QCT Projects



















* Citys with more than 20 Metro Projects and 70% or greater of their projects in QCTs.15
Appendix B
Percent of Poverty Cells in a Concentrated Poverty Neighborhood
Results over 1,000 random initial conditions
No Fixed Location Low-Income Housing Projects









         
Mean=0.58032 
0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75
@RISK Student Version
For Academic Use Only
0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75
5% 90% 5%
.4667  .7 
Mean=0.58032 16
Percent of Poverty Cells in a Concentrated Poverty Neighborhood
Results over 1,000 random initial conditions
Four Clustered Fixed Location Low-Income Housing Projects







         
Mean=0.7013667 
0.5 0.575 0.65 0.725 0.8
@RISK Student Version
For Academic Use Only
0.5 0.575 0.65 0.725 0.8
5% 90% 5%
.6133  .7533 
Mean=0.7013667 17
Percent of Poverty Cells in a Concentrated Poverty Neighborhood
Results over 1,000 random initial conditions
Four Separate Fixed Location Low-Income Housing Projects








         
Mean=0.53732 
0.46 0.4875 0.515 0.5425 0.57
@RISK Student Version
For Academic Use Only
0.46 0.4875 0.515 0.5425 0.57
5% 90% 5%
.5267  .5533 
Mean=0.53732 